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OBSTRUCTION OF PASSWAYS
The right of the owner of an estate, servient to another's
easement of way, to obstruct the passway by the erection of
gates is a question which has been before the Kentucky Court
of Appeals many times. That the question is a live one is in1
dicated by the large percentage of the cases that are recent.
Since there is at least one Kentucky decision upon nearly every
phase of the question, this article has been intentionally local
ized.
Secondary writers usually devote the same discussion to
(1) obstructions by the erection of gates and (2) obstructions by
the erection of fences, treating the two types of obstruction together.2 The grouping is open to objection. The two types of
obstruction are very different in their natures. A gate in proper
working order is but a partial obstruction of a passway, while
a fence, in the nature of things, would ordinarily obstruct the
passway completey. It might very well be that under a given
set of circumstances the owner of the servient tract would be
entitled to maintain a gate across the passway, while the maintenance of a fence, under precisely the same circumstances,
would not be countenanced.3 Finally, as a practical matter,
most of the cases have to do -with gates, not with fences. This
article treats of the erection of gates, and not of fences, across
easements of way.
As for the right of the owner of an estate, servient to
another's easement of way, to erect gates across the passway,
no unqualified answer can be given. Under some circumstances
he has that right; under others he has not. The purpose of this
article is to analyze and classify the elements favorable and unfavorable to the existence of the right. In no other way can
a satisfactory answer to the general question be given.
It will be found that the mode of creation of the passway
has an important bearing upon the question of the erection of
2 Of the thirty-six Kentucky cases considered in this article, thirtyfive were decided since 1897, and twenty-one since 1914.
2 See, for example, 19 C. J. 981, 986; 9 R. C. L. 800; 23 Am. & Eng.

Enc. Law (2d ed.) 34.
3
See infra at note 44.
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gates across it. For example, a prescriptive passway, created
by adverse user for the statutory period, is governed by rules
differdnt from those to which a passway created by express
4
grant is subject.
The nature of the passway, as determined by the mode of its
creation, also provides a basic principle of classification. The
cases fall into two general groups: (A) those in which the easement is created by grant, reservation or devise; (B) those in
-which the easement is acquired by prescriptive user. 5
It may be remarked, parenthetically, that in grouping easements of way created by grant, reservation or devise, the writer
has again departed somewhat from the usual treatment. The
customary classification is, (1) easements created by grant or
reservation, (2) easements acquired by' prescription. No good
reason is seen for not classing easements created by devise with
those created by grant or reservation. In the case of a grant,
the grantor reserves every right, title and interest in the property not inconsistent with the purposes of the easement as
granted. 6 In the case of a reservation, the grantor retains only
his rights in the easement; all others pass to the grantee. These
rights of the fee owner, subject only to the easement, pass undiminished to his heirs; his death cannot dignity or increase the
interest of the ow~ner of the easement. Similarly, the devisee in
fee of land subject to an easement of way in favor of another
devisee succeeds to all the rights of his devisor, subject only to
the rights of the owner of the easement. In short, his rights
are indistinguishable from those of the grantor of an easement
of way, or of an heir of such grantor.
4

The distinction between the rules applicable to those two types

of easements of way is admirably stated in Whitalcer v. Yates, 200 Ky.
530, 255 S. W. 102 (1923).
5This classification is not quite exhaustive. McCauley v. Twyman,
33 Ky. L. R. 692, 110 S. W. 892 (1908), and Bard v. Batsell, 184 Ky. 11,
211 S. W. 185 (1919), involve passways created by common agreement,
for common use. In Reed v. Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644 (1924),
the passway was created by contract. In Maxwell v. McAtee, 9 B. Mon.
20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847); Oak Grove, Etc., Church v. Rice, 162 Ky.
525, 172 S.W. 927 (1915), and Story v. Allen, 221 Ky. 195, 298 S.W.
712 (1927), the easements were originally created by parol grant, and
rights thereunder were perfected by adverse user. But most of the
cases will be found to come within one of the two classes suggested.

0See infra, note 9.
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A. EASEMENT CREATED By GRANT, RESERVATON oR DEVISE.
It is apparent that there may be either of two situations as
to easements created by written instrument. The instrument
may contain express provisions as to the right of the owner of
the servient estate to erect and maintain gates across the passway. On the other hand, the instrument may be in general
terms, with very vague stipulations as to gates, or none at all.
Accordingly, for clarity and convenience of treatment we may
divide the general class of easements created by grant, reservation or devise into specific groups, (1) those where the instrument creating the easement, contains express provision as to
gates, and (2) those in which the instrument of creation is in
general terms.
(1) Express Provision as to Gates-Where the parties
have had the foresight to embody their understanding as to the
erection of gates across the passway in the instrument creating
7
it, their intention, so far as it can be ascertained, is controlling.
The question then becomes one of construction, rather than one
of the application of rules of law upon the erection of gates
across an easement of way. This class of easements is relatively
small, and presents no problem save that of interpretation of
the language used in the instrument creating the easement.
(2) Grant 'Silent or Vague as to Gates.-The early Kentucky case of Maxwell v. MoAtee s is the leading case upon easements of this nature. It has been cited literally dozens of times
in later cases from many jurisdictions, and has supplied practically every secondary authority with its statement of the rule
applicable to such easements.
In that case Marshall, C. J., writing for the court, formulates the rule as follows:
7 "We are confined to a construction of the language of the parties
as inserted by them in their deed." Thomas, J., in Gossett v. Chandler,
204 Ky. 402, 405, 264 S. W. 853, 855 (1924). See also Calvert v. Weddle,
19 Ky. L. R. 1883,-44 S. W. 648 (1898); Evans v. Motley, 25 Ky. L. R.
1825, 78 S. W. 877 (1904); Reed v. Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644
(1924) ; Mciauley v. Owens, 225 Ky. 7, 7 S. W. (2d) 489 (1928) ; Jones,
Easements, see. 402; note, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461.
'9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847). It should be noticed that
while the easement was originally created by parol grant, which was
Invalid, rights thereunder were perfected by prescriptive user. The
case may therefore be more properly classified under the second general
classification.
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"The grant of a passway in general terms, over a particular part
of the grantor's land, does not imply a negation of his right to erect
gates at the termini of the way in entering and leaving his land."
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasons that the bare
grant of a right of way passes nothing more than its terms

would imply. Every right in the land not inconsistent with its
use under the grant remains in the grantor. So long as the
grantor's exercise of dominion over the land does not lessen a
fair enjoyment of the passway, the grantee of the easement can-

not complain. 9
The concise statement of the rule in Maxwell v. MeAtee has

been amplified by subsequent writers.1 0 The rule as enunciated
by the later authorities comes to this: Where the grant is in
general terms, the absence of reservation of the right to maintain gates across the passway does not conclude the grantor's
right. Extrinsic evidence of tAle conditions and manner of use
of the easement, however, is admissible to interpret the general
terms, and may result in a denial of the right. This limitation
of the rule, if not carried to extremes,1 1 is soi~nd in principle,
and well-grounded on authority.
"'Conceding. that the agreement for the passway was in terms
equivalent to a grant,
.
.
still it is evident that the general grant
of a passway, or right of way, over the land of the grantor at a particular place, does not confer either the possession or the right of possession of the land, but the mere right of way, or of passing over it. And
nothing passes as an Incident to such a grant, but that which Is necessary for its reasonable and proper enjoyment [citing authorities]. Notwithstanding such a grant there remains with the grantor the right of
full dominion and use of the land, except so far as a limitation of his
right Is essential to the fair enjoyment of the right of way which he has
granted. • It is not necessary that the grantor should expressly reserve
any right which he may exercise consistently with a fair enjoyment
of the grant. Such rights remain with him because they are not
granted. And for the same reason, the exercise of any of them cannot
be complained of by the grantee, who can claim no other limitation
upon the rights of the grantor but such as are expressed in the grant,
or necessarily implied in the right of reasonable enjoyment."
See briefer statement, to the same effect, Whitaker v. Yates, 200 Ky.
530, 533, 255 S. W. 102, 104 (1923). And see Rice v. Ford, 120 S. W.
288 (1909); Higdon v. Nicholas, 204 Ky. 56, 263 S. W. 665 (1924);
Justice v. Justice, 216 Ky. 657, 288 S. W. 293 (1926); McCauley Vo
Owens, 225 Ky. 7, 7 S. W. (2d) 489 (1928).
" Miller v. Petttt, 127 Ky. 419, 32 Ky. L. R. 337, 105 S. W. 892
(1907); Raisor v. Lyons, 172 Ky. 314, 189 S. W. 234 (1916); Ford v.
Rice, 195 Ky. 185, 241 S. W. 835 (1922); Whitaker v. Yates, supra note
9; Jones, Easements, section 402; Washburn, Easements and Servitudes (4th ed.), p. 255; 1 Thompson on Real Property, section 532; 9
R. C. L. 800; 19 C. J. 986; 23 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 34.
1 See infra at note 18

KENTUCKY fLAW JOURNAL
B.

EASEMENTS CREATED BY PRESCRIPTIVE USER.

We come now to the second main classification of the cases.
Easements of way created by prescriptive user are governed, in
the main, by the same rules as those applicable to other prescriptive rights. "Where the right to the easement is acquired
by prescription, the owner of the dominant estate, and who becomes entitled to the easement, acquires the right as against the
owner of the servient estate to have it maintained in the same
condition (in which) it was while it was being acquired by the
adverse user. 12 " In short, as in the case of any other prescriptive easement, rights in a prescriptive easement of way are
period of premeasured and determined by the user during the
scription.'8 And where a gate is maintained by the servient
owner during the period, a prescriptive right to maintain it is
4
acquired.1
As has been seen, where the easement is created by grant,
reservation or devise in general terms, the circumstances and
manner of use of the easement are admissible to show the
understanding and intention of the parties with respect to
gates. 15 But where the easement is created by prescription, the
circumstances and manner of use of the easement are determinative of the question of gates. In other words, if the easement
is created by a written instrument mode of use affects the right
to erect gates only indirectly, i. e., by explaining the general
terms of the instrument, which is the source of the rights of
both parties. But if the easement is created by prescription,
mode of use is directly determinative of every right claimed in
or against the easement, including the right to ereet'gates. 1'
This distinction is more than a matter of words. Its importance becomes clearer when we consider one or two actual
Whitaker v. Yates, 200 Ky. 530, 255 S. W. 102 (1923).
Oak Grove, etc., C7hurch v. Rice, 162 Ky. 525, 172 S. W. 927 (1915);
Skaggs v. Carr, 178 Ky. 849, 200 S. W. 27 (1918); Flcner v. Lawrence,
187 Ky. 384, 220 S. W. 1041 (1920); Hunt v. Sutton, 188 Ky. 361, 222 S.
W. 84 (1920) ; Bridwe~l v. Beerman, 190 Ky. 227, 227 S. W. 165 (1921) ;
Haffner v. Bittell, 198 Ky. 78, 248 S. W. 223 (1923); McCarty v. Blanton,
219 Ky. 450, 293 S. W. 958 (1927); Jones, Easements, section 415; 1
Thompson on Real Property, section 534; 19 C. J. 967, 987; 9 R. C. L.
788; 23 Am. and Eng.Enc. Law (2d ed.) 34, n. 3; note, 48 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 91.
" Maxwel v. McAtee, 9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847) ; Lurker
V. Ross, 121 S. W. 647 (Ky. 1909).
"Supra at note 10.
10Cases supra notes 12, 13.
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cases. In MIZfer v. Pettit,17 an heir, 'in the distribution of her
father's lands, was given a passway across other lands of the
common ancestor to the public road. It does not appear whether
the passway was created by grant or devise. The passway ran
along a branch, was fenced on both sides, and had a gate at the
property line of the dominant owner. This fenced lane was
used for thirty or forty years with no other gates across it. The
owner of the servient estate stopped up the branch with poles,
and erected and wired up a gate across the way. In this way
he obstructed the jassway completely, and threatened to shoot
anyone who removed the obstructions. The court held the obstruction improper, upon the ground that after so long a period
of use a prescriptiv rtight was acquired to use the passway
free of gates.18
The court, although dealing with an easement created by
grant or devise, went into the field of prescriptive easements for
the rule upon which to rest its decision. The result is sound, but
it might have been reached upon other and surer grounds. In
the first place, undei no circumstances may the servient owner
obstruct the passway completely, as he did here. 19 Again, the
court might very well have decided that the manner of use of
the easement justified the presumption that the servient owner
had waived any right to erect gates across the passway.2 0 It is
submitted that, where the easement is created by grant, reservation or devise, the length of time of its use free from gates,
whether or not it was fenced, and all other matters relating to
the- mode of use are irrelevant save as they go to show one
thing-whether or not the servient owner, by implication, has
waived his right, if any, to maintain gates across the passway.
In Raisor v. Lyons,21 the passway was created by grant.
It was used for some fifty years with gates only at the points
where the passway entered and left the servient owner's land.
The servient owner then undertook to erect two intermediate
gates, and the owner of the easement sued to enjoin their erec- 127 Ky. 419, 32 Ky. L. R. 337, 105 S. W. 892 (1907).

"",If the right to a passway may be acquired by prescription, we
ean see no reason why a passway free from gates may not be acquired
In like manner."

" See infra, note 44.
"Authorities supra, note 10.

172 Ky. 314, 189 S. W. 234 (1916).
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tion. An injunction was granted. This case is valuable for contrast, showing the proper application of evidence of the manner
of use to an easement created by grant, reservation or devise.
Instead of saying that the owner of the easement acquired a
prescriptive right to a way free of additional gates, the court
held the circumstances to justify a presumption of waiver of the
22
servient owner's right to erect such gates.
Too much stress cannot be laid upon the importance of
accuracy of analysis and precision of expression, even to the
point of meticulous nicety. The case last considered is a model
of what is desirable in judicial expression. Miller v. Pettit23 is
an example of faulty analysis and inaccurate terminology.
Fences Along Way.
Whether or not the passway was
fenced during the prescriptive period is usually a circumstance
of importance in determining whether a gate can be maintained.
The usual rule as to prescriptive easements is that where the
way runs through uninclosed woodlands during the period of
prescription, no right to use it free of gates is acquired ;24 but
where the passway is a fenced lane, the servient owner cannot
erect gates across it after the expiration of the period. 2 5 The
same circumstance may be of importance as to easements of way
created by grant, reservation or devise. The existence of a
fenced lane may go to show a waiver of the servient owner's
27
right to erect gates, 26 where the absence of fences would not.
It is interesting to note that where the easement was
created by prescription, and the passway was fenced during
A "We would not gainsay the rule announced in Maxwell v. MeAtee, supra, that the grant of a way without any reservation of a right
to maintain gates, does not necessarily imply that the owner of the
land may not do so, but only hold that the rule does not apply where,
as here shown, the consideration for the grant, the object for which
it was made, and the manner in which it has been used and occupied
as a passway demonstrate that it was not the intention of the parties
that the owner of the servient estate might or should erect any gates
across It at a place or places other than at its termini."
Supra, nofe 17.
2
Flenerv. Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384, 220 S. W. 1041 (1920); Whitaker
v. Yates, 200 Ky. 530, 255 S. W. 102 (1923). And see Wray v. Brown,
155 Ky. 757, 160 S. W. 488 (1913).
' Oak Grove, etc., Church v. Rice, 162 Ky. 525, 172 S. W. 927 (1915);
Bridwell v. Beerman, 190 Ky. 227, 227 S. W. 165 (1921).
Compare
Wray v. Brown, supra, note 24.
.. Miller 'v. Pettit, 127 Ky. 419, 32 Ky. L. R. 337, 105 S. W. 892
(1907).
2TForZ v. Rice, 195 Ky. 185, 241 S. -W. 835 (1922); W7htakeer v.
Yates, 200 Ky. 530, 255 S. W. 102 (1923).
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the prescriptive period, the easement extends to the fence lines
upon ,either side, and is not limited to the actual wagon tracks
or beaten way.28
GENERAT OBSERVATIONS.

Having
great classes
creation, we
easements of

observed the outstanding differences in the two
of easements of way determined by their m6de of
may pass to certain considerations common to all
way, regardless of the mode of their creation.

TERMINI RULE.
29
Beginning with the great leading case of Maxwell v. McAtee,
a long line of Kentucky cases has announced the rule that where
the servient owner has the right to erect gates across a passway,
he must erect them at the termini of the way; i. e., where it
enters and leaves his land.30 This limitation of location is to
some extent a reiteration of the rule in Maxwell v. MoAtee, in
which the gate in question actually was at a terminus. There
has been a tendency to place less emphasis upon the limitation
of the right to erect gates to the termini. 31 Where a rigid insistence upon the limitation would work hardship, it has been, expressly renounced.3 2 But as a general rule, a gate erected at
"Haffner v. Bittelt, 198 Ky. 78, 248 S. W. 223 (1923).
, 9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847).
"Bland v. Smith, 23 Ky. L. R. 1802, 66 S. W. 181 (1902); Smith v.
Pennington, 122 Ky. 355, 28 Ky. L. R. 1282, 91 S. W. 730, 8 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 149 (1906); Evans v. Cook, 33 Ky. L. R. 788, 111 S. W. 326 (1908);
Oak Grove, etc., Church v. Rice, 162 Ky. 525, 172 S. W. 927 (1915);
Raisor v. Lyons, 172 Ky. 314, 189 S. W. 234 (1916); Miller v. Miller,
182 Ky. 797, 207 S. W. 450 (1919); Hunt v. Sutton, 188 Ky. 361, 222 S.
W. 84 (1920); Ford v. Rice, 195 Ky. 185, 241 S. W. 835 (1922); Reed v.
Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644 (1924); Justice v. Justice, 216 Ky.
657, 288 S. W. 293 (1926); compare McCauley v. Owens, 225 Ky. 7, 7
S. W. (2d) 489 (1928).
3 Compare Flener v. Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384, 220 S. W. 1041 (1920),
in which the "termini" limitation is omitted altogethIer; Bridwell v.
Beerman, 190 Ky. 227, 227 S. W. 165 (1921); Whitaker v. Yates, 200 Ky.
530, 255 S. W. 102 (1923), holding that servient owner could put gates
across way "especially at its termini"; Evans v. Motley, 25 Ky. L. R.
1825, 78 S. W. 877 (1904), in which the court'ordered that the servient
owner be allowed to maintain gates "at convenient places;" Justice v.
Justice, 216 Ky. 657, 288 S. W. 293 (1926), where the court approved a
gate erected a short distance from one of the termini.
" As, for example, where the actual terminus, or property line, is
so located that one would be forced to wade in a stream to open a gate
erected at that point. Miller v. Miller, 182 Ky. 797, 207 S. W. 450
(1919); Gossett v. Chandler,204 Ky. 402, 264 S. W. 853 (1924). Compare
Justice v. Justice, supra note 31.
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one of the termini of the passway, especially at its junction
with a public road,3 3 would. seem to have a better chance of
judicial approval.
A closer examination of the cases reiterating the "termini
rule" is instructive. It will be found that four of the cases 34
are only negative authority for the rule since they hold that
gates may, under certain circumstances, be erected at the termini
of the passway, but do not hold that gates may not be erected
elsewhere. While Oak Grove, etc., Clhurch v. Rice,3 5 Hunt v.
Sutton,3 6 and Bridwell v. Beerman3 7 each holds the gate in question improperly maintained, and seems to rest the decision in
part upon the rule under consideration, there were other facts
in each case which would have justified the court's conclusion
without mention of the "termini rule." Raisor v. Lyons,35 while
it holds adversely to the maintenance of intermediate gates,
reaches its conclusion by an interpretation of the grant involved,
in the light of the conditions of use of the passway.8 9
The one ease which may be said to be bottomed upon the
"termini rule" is Evans v. Cook .40 There, in an action instituted under section 4354 (now section 3739a-12), Kentucky
Statutes, for the recovery of a fine imposed for the obstruction of
a roadway, it was held that the burden of proof was on the defense to show that the gates were at the termini. Failing so to
show, the defendant was adjudged liable to the fine, and the
court refused to enjoin its collection.
In this state of the -authorities, it may well be doubted
whether an insistence upon the ancient rule serves any useful
3Maxwell v. McAtee, BZan
v. Smith, Bridwefl v. Beerman,
Whitaker v. Yates, supra notes 29, 30;-Lurker v. Ross, 121 S. W. 647
(Ky. 190); Justice v. Justice, supra note 31
'.Maxwell v. MeAtee, 9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 1847; Bland v.
Smith, 23 Ky. L. R. 1802, 66 S. W. 181 (1902); Ford v. Rice, 195 Ky. 185,
241 S. W. 835 (1922); Reed v. Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644 (1924).
In the last case, an intermediate gate was actually upheld.
162 Ky. 525, 172 S. W. 927 (1915).
8188 Ky. 361, 222 S. W. 84 (1920).
"190 Ky. 227, 227 S.V.
(1921).
"172 Ky. 314, 189 S. W. 165
234 (1916).
" See supra, note 22.
40 33 Ky. L. R. 788, 111 S. W. 326 (1908).
In Raisor v. Lyons, supra
note 38, the court refers to the issue of fact In this case as to whether
or not the gates were located at the termini, which "makes it, as previously stated, the only case in this jurisdiction expressly declaring
that the owner of the land over which the passway runs has no right
to erect gates elsewhere than at its termini."
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purpose. Other things being equal, a gate erected midway of
the passage is no greater" obstruction than the same gate erected
at one of its termini. The question of the reasonableness of the
obstruction is always the prime consideration.4 1 Other jurisdictions have not been so insistent upon the location of a gate
at the point where the passway enters or leaves the servient
estate. 42 While the location of the gate is one of the circumstances to be considered, it should not of itself be of sufficient
importance to support a decision.
REASoNABLENESS OF OBSTRUCTION.

It may be stated generally that the gate, where it may be
maintained at all, must not obstruct the passway unreasonably.
What is an unreasonable obstruction is largely to be determined
by the facts of the given case. In general, it may be said 'that
4
the gate or gates must not obstruct the passway unnecessarily, s
or completely, 44 and must be needed, to some extent, for the
inclosure and protection of the servient owner's land.4 5
DOMINANT OWNERiMUST

CLOSs

GATE.
Where the servient owner has a right to maintain gates
across an easement of way, it is the duty of the dominant owner
41

See infra at note

43.

856 (Me. 1890); Green v. Goff, 39
1' Compare Ames v. Shaw, 19 A.
N. E. 975 (I1. 1894) ; Hartman v. Fick, 31 At. 342 (Pa. 1895) ; especially
Dyer v. Walker, 75 N. W. 79 (Wis. 1898).
0Rice v. Ford, 120 S. W. 288 (Ky. 1909); Oak Grove, etc., Church
V. Rice, 162 Ky. 525, 172 S. W. 927 (1915); Ford v. Rice, 195 Ky. 185,
241 S. W. 835 (1922); Whitaker v. Yates, 200 Ky. 530, 255 S. W. 102
(1923) ; Justice v. Justice, 216 Ky. 657, 288 S. W. 293 (1926) ; Mcauley
v. Owens, 225 Ky. 7, 7 S. W. (2d) 489 (1928).
-Ledford v. Cummins, 20 Ky. L. R. 393, 46 S. W. 507 (1898); Miller
V. Pettit, 127 Ky. 419, 32 Ky. L. R. 337, 105 S. W. 892 (1907); McCauley
V. Twyman, 33 Ky. L. R. 692, 110 S. W. 892 (1908); Stone v. Burkhead,
160 Ky. 47, 169 S. W. 489 (1914); Skaggs v. Carr, 178 Ky. 849 200 S. W.
27 (1918) ; Brookshire v. Harp, 186 Ky. 217, 216 S. W. 379 (1919) ; Hunt
v. Sutton, 188 Ky. 361, 222 S. W. 84 (1920); Story v. Allen, 221 Ky. 195,
298 S. W. 379 (1927). And this is true even though the dominant
owner attempts to subject the passway to extraordinary or improper
use. McCarty v. Blanton, 219 Ky. 450, 293 S. W. 958 (1927).
"Maxwefl v. MoAtee, 9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847); Bland,
v. Smith, 23 Ky. L. R. 1802, 66 S. W. 181 (1902); Evans v. Motley, 25
KY. L. R. 1825, 78 S. W. 877 (1904); Smith v. Pennington, 122 Ky. 355,
28 Ky. L. R. 1282, 91 S. W. 730, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 149 (1906) ; Raisor v.
Lyons, 172 Ky. 314, 189 S. W. 234 (1916). See also authorities supra,
note 43.
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to close such gates after passing through.48 His duty to keep
4
the gates closed may be enforced by injunction.
STATUTORY PROVISION.

By Section 3779a-12, Kentucky Statutes, a civil fine of ten
dollars may be imposed upon anyone obstructing a passway.
This statute, or rather its identically worded forerunner, is
declared to extend to all passways, whether created by law or
by acts of parties. 48 Where the servient owner wrongfully
maintains a gate, he is liable to fne under this statute. 49
DEVOLUTION OF RIGHT.

Where the servieit owner has a right to maintain gates and
the right is not such as to be lost by the passage of time, it
passes to his heirs or grantees as an incident of the servient
estate. 50 In the case cited, the heirs of a common ancestor
created a common passway by agreement. From the beginning
one or more gates were maintained. It was held that the right
to maintain gates passed to the grantee of several of the heirs.
If the passway is prescriptive, but the servient owner has
preserved his right by maintaining a gate, his heir or grantee
may do so. 51 Where the servient owner has a contract right to
maintain a gate, such right is not lost by a temporary removal
of the gate, and a purchaser who bought in the meantime is entitled to restore it.52
DOMINANT OwNER. WITHOUT RIGHT.

While this article has to do with the right of the owner of
the servient estate to erect gates across a passway, a brief word
"Evans v. Motley, 25 Ky. L. R. 1825, 78 S. W. 877 (1904).
4Damron v. Justice, 162 Ky. 101, 172 S. W. 120 (1915).
This case,
it Is true, involves a gate erected by the dominant owner. But he owes
the same duty toward gates erected by the servient owner. Cf. Reed v.
Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644 (1924). And see Brill v. Brill, 15 N.
E. 538 (N. Y. 1888); Mendelson v. MeCable, 144 Cal. 230, 77 Pac. 915
(1904); Griffin v. Gilchrist, 29 R. 1. 200, 69 AtL 683 (1908); Geohegan.
v. Henry, 55 Ir. L. J. Rep. 190, annotated 35 Harv. L. Rev. 767; Helwig
V. Miller, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 171.
4'5Hughes v. Holbrook, 32 Ky. L. R. 1210, 108 S. W. 225 (1908).
" Evans v. Cook, 33 Ky. L. R. 788, 111 S. W. 326 (1908).
"'Bard v. Batsell, 184 Ky. 11, 211 S. W. 185 (1919).
I'Maxw6ll v. MeAtee, 9 B. Mon. 20, 48 Am. Dec. 409 (1847). Cf.
Brookshire v. Harp, 186 Ky. 217, 216 S. W. 379 (1919).
2 Reed v. Flynn, 205 Ky. 783, 266 S. W. 644 (1924).

OBSTRUCTION OF PASSWAYS

as to the dominant owner may be permissible. He has no right,
either to fence the passway or to erect gates across it, without
the consent of the servient owner. 53
Jimi~s NoRRIs McP FuSON.
Louisville, Kentucky.

"Skaggs v. Carr, 178 Ky. 849, 200 S. W. 27 (1918); Flener v. Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384, 220 S. W. 1041 (1920); Higdon v. Nichols, 204 Ky.
56, 263 S. W. 665 (1924). See also Sizer v. Quinlan, 82 Wis. 390, 52 N.
W. 590, 16 L. R. A. 512, 33 Am. St. Rep. 55 (1892); Jones, Easements,
section 410; 19 C. J. 987; 9 R. C. L. 799; note, 95 Am. St. Rep. 329.

